In the case before the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, the plaintiff, Nacha Rene, sued Royal City Bell, LLC, et al., under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) for discrimination based on race, hostile work environment, sex discrimination, associational age discrimination, associational national origin discrimination, and retaliation. The district court dismissed Rene’s claims on the grounds that her petition was not timely filed, prompting Rene to appeal the decision.
The district court decided that Rene’s claims were dismissed with prejudice because the petition was filed ninety-one days after the issuance of the right-to-sue letter, thus exceeding the ninety-day statute of limitations. .
Factual Overview
In September 2018, Rene, a black female, started working at a Taco Bell restaurant operated by Royal City Bell, LLC, and Diversified Restaurant Group, LLC (collectively referred to as “Bell”). She was terminated on February 11, 2021. Subsequently, Rene filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR), receiving a right-to-sue letter dated July 1, 2022. On September 29, 2022, she filed a petition against Bell alleging MHRA violations and a separate claim for violation of the Missouri Service Letter statute.
Legal Analysis
Statute of Limitations and Timeliness of Filing: Bell argued that Rene’s petition was filed one day late, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel. Church & Dwight Co., Inc. v. Collins, which they claimed held the date of issuance of the MCHR’s right-to-sue letter should be included in the ninety-day statute of limitations computation. Rene countered, citing Rule 44.01(a), that the day the right-to-sue letter was issued should not be counted, making her filing timely.
The appellate court scrutinized the trial court’s interpretation and application of the statute of limitations, particularly the treatment of the right-to-sue letter’s issuance date in calculating the ninety-day period. It highlighted that both Section 1.040 of the Missouri Statutes and Rule 44.01(a) exclude the day of the event (in this case, the issuance of the right-to-sue letter) from the computation of the time limit, thereby deeming Rene’s filing within the acceptable ninety-day timeframe. The appellate court found the trial court’s dismissal based on the statute of limitations to be legally erroneous, reversing the decision and remanding the case for further proceedings. The court clarified that the Supreme Court in Collins did not address whether the day of issuance of a right-to-sue letter counts in computing the ninety-day statute of limitations under section 213.111.1. Therefore, the trial court’s and Bell’s reliance on Collins for this proposition was misplaced.
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