Plaintiff Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow sued defendants City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, raising claims of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. Muldrow appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed. Muldrow then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted.
Factual Overview
Muldrow worked as a plainclothes officer in the St. Louis Police Department’s Intelligence Division from 2008 through 2017. In 2017, the new Intelligence Division commander, Captain Michael Deeba, requested to transfer Muldrow out of the unit and replace her with a male police officer. Against Muldrow’s wishes, the Department approved the transfer and reassigned her to a uniformed job in the Fifth District. Although Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule changed. She no longer worked on priority investigations with high-ranking officials, lost access to an unmarked take-home vehicle, and had a less regular schedule involving weekend shifts.
Legal Analysis
Whether Title VII Requires a Showing of Significant Harm: The Supreme Court held that a Title VII plaintiff challenging a job transfer must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but the harm need not be significant. The Court rejected the City’s arguments based on statutory text, precedent, and policy.
Textual Argument: The Court rejected the City’s textual argument that the ejusdem generis canon requires a significant-harm requirement. The Court found that the shared trait among the prohibited discriminatory actions is that each occurs by way of an employment action, which is sufficient to unite the provision’s parts.
Precedent Argument: The Court distinguished its precedent in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, which adopted a “materially adverse” standard for Title VII retaliation claims. The Court explained that the reasoning in White was specific to the retaliation context and does not apply to the anti-discrimination provision at issue.
Policy Argument: The Court dismissed the City’s policy argument that a significant-injury requirement is necessary to prevent an influx of insubstantial lawsuits. The Court noted that even if the City’s predictions come true, it would be the result of the statute Congress drafted, and the Court will not add words to achieve what some employers think is a desirable result.
Application to Muldrow’s Case: The Supreme Court found that the Eighth Circuit applied the wrong standard to Muldrow’s suit by requiring her to show a significant employment disadvantage. The Court stated that Muldrow’s allegations, if properly preserved and supported, meet the test of showing some harm. However, the Court recognized that the decisions below may have rested in part on issues of forfeiture and proof, which it left for the lower courts to address on remand.
Concurring Opinions
Justice Thomas: Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Alito that the Courts of Appeals appear to articulate the same principle with slightly varying verbal formulations. He was not convinced that the Eighth Circuit necessarily imposed a heightened-harm requirement but agreed to vacate and remand to the extent the Eighth Circuit’s analysis is inconsistent with a more-than-trifling-harm requirement.
Justice Alito: Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, finding that assuming all the facts mentioned by the Court are relevant and properly presented, Muldrow’s transfer altered the terms or conditions of her employment. However, he criticized the Court’s opinion as unhelpful, predicting that lower court judges will continue to do just what they have done for years while minding the words they use.
Justice Kavanaugh: Justice Kavanaugh agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Chambers v. District of Columbia, which held that a discriminatory transfer violates Title VII even when it does not change an employee’s compensation. He disagreed with the Court’s new “some harm” requirement, finding it unnecessary under the text of Title VII. However, he noted that the Court’s “some harm” requirement appears to be a relatively low bar that plaintiffs should easily meet in most cases. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
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