Plaintiff DaShaun McCray sued defendant Denis McDonough, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas raising claims of racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Before the court is Defendant McDonough’s motion for summary judgment.
Statement of Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff DaShaun McCray began working as a Grade 2 Staff Nurse in the Office of Community Care (OCC) at the Robert J. Dole Veterans Affairs Medical and Regional Office Center in Wichita, Kansas on December 28, 2015. In February 2019, McCray assumed a Nurse Manager position with Ruth Duda as her direct supervisor. By January 2020, McCray’s working relationship with Duda had deteriorated, leading McCray to meet with Duda’s supervisor, Chief of Staff Dr. Robert V. Cummings, to complain about Duda’s behavior.
On January 31, 2020, McCray contacted an EEO Counselor for informal counseling, and on March 30, 2020, she filed a formal complaint of employment discrimination with the VA’s EEO office. McCray’s formal EEO complaint asserted eight separate claims, including allegations that Duda failed to train McCray adequately, increased her workload, refused to allow her to speak in a meeting, violated her personal space, undermined her abilities as a supervisor, and threatened to fire her.
In May 2020, McCray transferred to the VA facility in Aurora, Colorado, receiving a $42,472 pay raise with her promotion to the new position.
Legal Analysis
Narrowing of Claims: The court first addressed the viability of McCray’s claims, determining that she must limit her claims to discrete events rather than rely on an aggregate approach. The court also evaluated which claims McCray had administratively exhausted, narrowing the scope of viable claims to those included in her formal EEO charge.
Prima Facie Case for Racial Discrimination: The court analyzed McCray’s racial discrimination claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. For each claim, the court evaluated whether McCray had established a prima facie case by showing that she suffered an adverse employment action and that the circumstances gave rise to an inference of discrimination.
Failure to Train: The court found that McCray failed to demonstrate an adverse employment action or circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination regarding Duda’s alleged failure to train her.
Increased Workload: The court concluded that McCray’s increased workload did not qualify as an adverse employment action and did not give rise to an inference of discrimination.
Refusing to Allow Plaintiff to Speak: The court determined that Duda’s refusal to allow McCray to speak during a meeting did not constitute an adverse employment action or give rise to an inference of discrimination.
Undermining Plaintiff’s Authority: The court found that McCray failed to establish that Duda’s alleged undermining of her authority qualified as an adverse employment action or gave rise to an inference of discrimination.
Acts of Intimidation and Yelling: The court concluded that Duda’s alleged acts of intimidation and yelling did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action or give rise to an inference of discrimination.
Threats to Terminate Employment: The court determined that McCray failed to establish that Duda’s alleged threat to terminate her employment constituted an adverse employment action or gave rise to an inference of discrimination.
Prima Facie Case for Retaliation: The court analyzed McCray’s retaliation claims under the same McDonnell Douglas framework, evaluating whether McCray had engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, suffered a materially adverse action, and demonstrated a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.
The court found that McCray failed to establish a causal connection between her protected activity and the alleged retaliatory actions. Additionally, the court determined that none of the alleged retaliatory actions rose to the level of materially adverse actions required to support a retaliation claim.
The court granted defendant Denis McDonough’s motion for summary judgment on all of McCray’s racial discrimination and retaliation claims, finding that no reasonable juror could conclude that McCray had established a prima facie case for either discrimination or retaliation.
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