Plaintiff Mark Wood sued defendants Learjet, Inc. and Bombardier, Inc. in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas raising claims of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and retaliation. Before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
Statement of Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff, age 59, worked for Defendant Learjet, Inc., a Kansas corporation and subsidiary of Defendant Bombardier, Inc. Plaintiff originally worked as a Principal Engineer Specialist (PES) on the Learjet 85 program from 2009 until January 2015, when that program was terminated. Dan Cochran and John Allan recommended and recalled Plaintiff into a PES position within the Bombardier Flight Test Center (BFTC), effective January 21, 2015.
In late 2014 or 2015, Andy Paterson, Director of Systems Engineering for BFTC, conducted a meeting where he presented a diagram of the BFTC workforce and discussed how there were too many older people at the top and not enough younger people. Paterson stated that Bombardier or BFTC would like to see more young people in the company’s workforce. Additionally, Tom Bisges, Vice President of BFTC, made a presentation stating that the average age of the company was too high, and the company planned to reduce the age with an age bias hiring policy.
When Plaintiff worked for the L85 program in 2013 and 2014, he received overall “exceeds expectations” performance ratings. After transferring to BFTC, his 2015 overall performance rating was “fully meets expectations,” though he received lower scores on Task Management System (TMS) usage.
In January 2016, Dan Menzies replaced Cochran as Plaintiff’s supervisor and designated Plaintiff as a focal for the power plant team. By June 2016, Menzies removed Plaintiff as focal and replaced him with Haiden Stanger, who was 40 years old. Menzies testified that Plaintiff was not meeting expectations and decided to place him on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP).
On June 30, 2016, Plaintiff was placed on a PIP which required him to maintain at least 85% completion of TMS tasks. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff was complying with updating TMS, though it is undisputed that four weeks into the PIP, Plaintiff was making progress.
On July 27, 2016, during a pre-flight review, a discrepancy was noticed between the maximum thrust rating that was approved (23K) and the rating expected for the flight plan (25K). The flight had to be cancelled pending reconfiguration of the engines. After this incident, Allan decided to terminate Plaintiff, viewing it as a safety violation. Plaintiff and Allan “absolutely” disagree regarding the engine thrust rating incident.
Prior to Plaintiff’s termination, on July 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed an internal EEO complaint alleging age discrimination. The decision-makers, however, did not know about this complaint until after Plaintiff’s termination.
Plaintiff was terminated on August 3, 2016. His job duties were spread across ten other employees and one contractor within his former workgroup. Of the ten employees, four were under age 40, six were under age 50, and two were older than Plaintiff.
Legal Analysis
Age Discrimination Claim
The court began by addressing the standard for an ADEA claim, noting that a plaintiff must establish “by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged adverse employment action.” Without direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies.
Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) he was 40 or older; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified for the position; and (4) he was treated less favorably than others not in the protected class.
The court found that Plaintiff established a prima facie case. It was undisputed that Plaintiff was over 40 and that his termination constituted an adverse employment action. Regarding qualification, the court noted Plaintiff’s prior favorable performance ratings and that he retained the same qualifications he had when hired. As for less favorable treatment, the court found that Plaintiff presented evidence raising an inference of discrimination, including statements by management about reducing the age of the workforce.
After finding that Defendants had articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination (performance issues and a safety violation), the court analyzed whether Plaintiff had demonstrated pretext. The court identified several disputed issues of fact precluding summary judgment:
- Disputes regarding Plaintiff’s TMS performance and whether it was improving
- Termination of Plaintiff before completion of the 90-day PIP
- Disputes about whether safety investigation protocols were followed
- Evidence that others involved in the thrust configuration issue were not disciplined
- Evidence of ageist comments by management
Based on these disputed facts, the court denied summary judgment on the age discrimination claim.
Retaliation Claim
For the retaliation claim, the court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework, requiring Plaintiff to show: (1) he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and adverse action.
The parties agreed that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by filing an internal complaint and that his termination was a materially adverse action. However, the court found no evidence that Allan, the decision-maker, knew about Plaintiff’s complaint before terminating him. Without this knowledge, Plaintiff could not establish the causal connection required for a prima facie case.
Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, the court noted that he failed to direct the court to any evidence of pretext relating to his retaliation claim. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
The court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim but granted the motion on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
Schrag on Law 