Plaintiff Aspen Chacon sued defendant Wellsky in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas raising claims of unlawful discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Wellsky moved to dismiss Chacon’s retaliation claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Factual Overview
Aspen Chacon began working for Wellsky as a sales representative in March 2021, initially reporting to general manager Aaron Winkelmann. Although she struggled under Winkelmann’s management, her performance improved when Jeremy Henry became her direct supervisor, though she still worked with Winkelmann daily.
While employed at Wellsky, Chacon earned a dual master’s degree in healthcare administration and business administration. She alleged that Winkelmann felt threatened by her being a woman with better education and credentials than him. Chacon claimed Winkelmann had a history of treating women differently than men and provided fewer opportunities to women in the office. When she attempted to address this issue with him directly, she stated that he did not receive the criticism well.
Chacon also had concerns about unethical business deals, which she brought to Winkelmann’s attention. She believed Winkelmann did not want to entertain these concerns because he did not like being called out by a woman, and she claimed he frequently spoke to her in a derogatory manner.
In June 2023, Winkelmann discovered Chacon was a lesbian when he saw a photo of her with her girlfriend on her desk. A few months later, in September 2023, while working on two business deals, Chacon sent sales contracts to a client that contained comments left on one of the documents. After she corrected the mistake, she was terminated the next day, allegedly for lacking attention to detail.
On October 27, 2023, Chacon filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging sex discrimination. She checked the box labeled “sex” but not the one labeled “retaliation.” In her narrative description, Chacon stated that Winkelmann was difficult to work under, did not appreciate that she was a vocal female employee, and that women working under him received fewer opportunities than men. She mentioned trying to address this with him. She also noted that when she raised concerns about deals that felt unconscionable, she was met with pushback. Chacon claimed she believed she was terminated because of her sex, her level of education as a female, being a homosexual female, and being in a homosexual relationship.
The EEOC issued Chacon a Notice of Right to Sue on March 20, 2024. Chacon timely sued Wellsky for unlawful discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. Wellsky then moved for partial dismissal, contending that Chacon did not exhaust her administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim.
Legal Analysis
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The court noted that before filing a Title VII lawsuit, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC describing the basis for the charge. The lawsuit is then limited to what could “reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination submitted to the EEOC.” A plaintiff’s failure to mark a particular box on the EEOC charge creates a presumption that the charging party is not asserting claims represented by that box, which can only be rebutted if the charge “clearly sets forth the basis of the claim.”
The court found that Chacon did not check the retaliation box on her EEOC charge and therefore had to establish that she clearly set forth the basis for a retaliation claim in the charge. The court determined that while Chacon stated she “tried to address” Winkelmann’s differential treatment of women, her charge did not explain what she said to him or whether his conduct was discriminatory. Moreover, she made no allegations that her termination was connected to the sex-related concerns she raised with Winkelmann.
The court also noted that Chacon expressly listed the reasons she believed she was terminated as “sex, [her] level of education as a female, being a homosexual female, and being in a homosexual relationship,” but did not include retaliation for opposing sex discrimination. The court concluded that her charge would not reasonably notify the EEOC that it needed to investigate whether she was terminated for opposing disparate treatment based on sex.
The court rejected Chacon’s arguments that the EEOC could reasonably interpret her charge to include a retaliation claim, emphasizing that the standard is not whether the EEOC could reasonably interpret the charge, but whether she actually asserted a retaliation claim. Since Chacon failed to check the “retaliation” box and did not clearly set forth the existence and basis for a retaliation claim, the court found she did not meet the threshold requirement of exhausting her administrative remedies before suing Wellsky for unlawful retaliation.
For the foregoing reasons, the court granted Wellsky’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Chacon’s retaliation claim.
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