Schrag on Law

Plaintiff Larry Holman sued defendant Textron Aviation, Inc. in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas raising claims of age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Before the court is Defendant Textron Aviation’s motion for summary judgment.

Statement of Undisputed Facts

Larry Holman, born in 1960, began working for Textron’s predecessor in January 2008 when he was over 40 years old. Textron eventually promoted Holman to a management role known as a Value Stream Leader (VSL). As a VSL, Holman was a mandatory reporter under Textron’s No-Harassment Policy, which required supervisors to report harassment to their supervisors, Human Resources, Ethics and Compliance, or Legal representatives.

In August 2021, a Textron employee named Melissa Derber reported to Human Resources that Sidney Toppah, Sr., an employee supervised by Holman, had sexually harassed her earlier that year. Textron investigated the allegations and determined that Toppah had violated the company’s No-Harassment Policy. As a result, Textron terminated Toppah.

During the investigation, Textron discovered that Derber had first reported the harassment to her coworker Michael Grayum, who told his boss, Luke Matlock, also a VSL. Matlock referred Grayum to Holman, and Grayum and Holman subsequently discussed the allegations. Instead of reporting the allegations to human resources or his supervisor as required by company policy, Holman directly told Toppah to “stay away from the girls” and “leave the women alone.” Because of Holman’s failure to properly report the allegations, Textron did not learn of Toppah’s conduct until Derber reported it months later directly to human resources.

Initially, Holman’s supervisors did not believe he should be terminated. However, after conversations with Brandy Ketchersid, who conducted the investigation, they changed their minds and decided termination was appropriate. In September 2021, Holman met with his supervisor and Ketchersid, who informed him that Textron would be terminating him but would allow him to retire for dignity purposes. Holman chose retirement. Textron replaced him with two younger employees.

The investigation also revealed that Matlock, who was younger than Holman, had engaged in similar conduct but was merely counseled rather than terminated. Textron’s differential treatment of the two employees forms the basis of Holman’s age discrimination claim.

Legal Analysis

Age Discrimination and the McDonnell Douglas Framework:

The court noted that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an individual because of the individual’s age, protecting individuals who are at least 40 years old. To succeed, a plaintiff must prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse decision. Since this case was based on circumstantial evidence, the court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If successful, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then prove that the defendant’s proffered reason was pretextual.

Textron did not dispute that Holman established a prima facie case of discrimination but argued that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating him—his failure to follow company policy regarding reporting harassment—and that Holman could not show this reason was pretextual.

Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason:

The court found that Textron met its “exceedingly light” burden of establishing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Holman. Textron’s stated reason—that Holman was disciplined for failing to follow company policy with regard to reporting harassment—was not facially discriminatory and was reasonably specific and clear.

Pretext Analysis:

Holman offered three main arguments for why Textron’s justification was pretextual:

1. First, Holman pointed to the differential treatment between himself and the younger Matlock. The court rejected this argument, finding that Matlock was not a proper comparator because Holman failed to present evidence that they shared the same supervisor. Even assuming they did, their conduct was materially distinguishable: Toppah was Holman’s responsibility, not Matlock’s, and they responded differently to Derber’s allegations. While Matlock told his employee to report to Holman, Holman told no one in the supervisory chain and only spoke privately to Toppah.
2. Second, Holman argued that Textron failed to follow its own written policies and that procedural irregularities marred the investigation. The court found that Holman failed to identify what provisions of Textron’s policy were violated or what facts suggested age-related animus. Additionally, Holman’s claim that a Labor Relations Manager was predisposed against him was immaterial without evidence that the alleged animus was attributable to age-related bias. The court also rejected Holman’s procedural irregularities argument because he failed to show how any alleged irregularity directly and uniquely disadvantaged him.
3. Third, Holman argued that Textron provided inconsistent rationales for its different treatment of Matlock and himself. The court found that the supposed inconsistency—regarding whether Matlock knew Derber’s allegations were sexual in nature—did not show that Textron had abandoned or changed its reason for terminating Holman. Both parties agreed that Textron disciplined Holman because he failed to follow company policy by not properly reporting the complaint.

The court concluded that Holman lacked evidence similar to that found in two Tenth Circuit cases where plaintiffs successfully showed pretext. Unlike those cases, Holman did not show that policy violations were commonplace, that Textron failed to follow its policies, that Textron offered conflicting rationales, or that Matlock was treated with more leniency for no reason.

For all these reasons, the court granted Textron’s motion for summary judgment.

The court granted Textron’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Holman failed to demonstrate that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether the decision to terminate him was pretextual.