Plaintiff Joshua Brooks sued defendant Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri raising claims of religious discrimination (failure to accommodate) and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Defendant Serta moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
Factual Overview
Joshua Brooks began working for Serta in November 2014 and performed successfully until the time relevant to this case. In 2021, following President Biden’s announcement that the Department of Labor would issue an emergency rule requiring large employers to ensure worker vaccination, Serta instituted a vaccine mandate. On October 7, 2021, Brooks submitted a request for accommodation from the vaccine mandate based on his Christian religious belief that receiving the vaccine would make him complicit in abortion, as some COVID-19 vaccines were developed using cell lines derived from fetal tissue.
After receiving no response for a month, Brooks inquired again and was granted an “accommodation” in the form of unpaid administrative leave effective November 28, 2021. His position was subsequently posted as a vacancy and later filled. Brooks alleged that counterparts in other divisions were permitted to work remotely without the vaccine, while his supervisor expressed animus toward Christians who refused it. He further alleged that by summer 2022, a co-worker was permitted to work and travel in person without the vaccine.
On December 20, 2021, Brooks filed a charge of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). On June 21, 2022, he filed an amended charge adding a claim of retaliation. After receiving a right-to-sue letter, Brooks filed his lawsuit in state court, which Serta removed to federal court. The case was stayed due to Serta’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy from January 2023 until December 2024, after which Serta filed the present motion to dismiss.
Legal Analysis
Administrative Exhaustion
Serta first contended that Brooks failed to exhaust administrative remedies because his MCHR charges did not allege constructive discharge and did not preserve a colorable claim of retaliation. The court disagreed regarding the constructive discharge claim, finding that Brooks’ MCHR charges were sufficient to give notice of this claim. The court noted that administrative complaints are interpreted liberally to advance the remedial purposes of legislation prohibiting unlawful employment practices. Brooks had alleged that Serta placed him on unpaid leave without benefits and posted his position, which a reasonable person could interpret as a separation lacking only in formality.
Religious Discrimination – Failure to Accommodate
To demonstrate religious discrimination under the MHRA for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement, (2) he informed his employer of his belief, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action for failing to comply with the requirement.
Serta argued that Brooks failed to state a claim because he did not sufficiently allege that his colleagues who were permitted to work remotely without the vaccine were similarly situated. The court found this argument inapposite because Brooks was not alleging that non-Christians were treated more favorably; rather, his comparator pleadings merely suggested that a reasonable accommodation was available.
The court concluded that Brooks adequately pleaded that he had a religious belief that conflicted with Serta’s vaccine mandate, that he informed Serta of this belief, and that he suffered an adverse employment action when he was constructively discharged or at least suspended without pay and benefits. The court accepted as true at this stage Brooks’ allegation that this adverse action was motivated by his religion.
Retaliation
For a retaliation claim under the MHRA, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he complained of discrimination or another practice prohibited by the MHRA, (2) the defendant took an adverse action against him, and (3) his complaint was the motivating factor in the adverse action.
The court found that Brooks failed to state a claim of retaliation. First, a mere request for an accommodation does not fall within the plain language of the MHRA as a protected activity. Second, while Brooks’ filing of his first charge was recognized protected activity, Serta took no adverse action in response to it. The only “action” Brooks pleaded was Serta’s inaction, maintaining the status quo where Brooks remained on unpaid leave. Given the sequence of events, Brooks could not claim that Serta retaliated against him for filing his first charge when Serta did nothing in response to it.
The court denied Serta’s motion to dismiss as to Count I (religious discrimination/failure to accommodate) and granted it as to Count II (retaliation).
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