Plaintiff Erika Cordova sued defendant Textron Aviation, Inc. in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas raising claims of sex, race, and national origin-based discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Before the court is Defendant Textron Aviation’s motion for summary judgment.
Statement of Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff Erika Cordova, a Hispanic woman of Mexican national origin, began working for defendant’s predecessor, Cessna Aircraft Company, in November 1997. Since July 2014, she has performed the tasks of an Assem Graphite 02, which involves the assembly, bond, and rework of graphite parts. At all relevant times, plaintiff’s supervisor was Michael Moberg, who held the title of Value Stream Leader (VSL). A VSL’s job duties include planning, organizing, and controlling staffing costs; ensuring timely production flow; maintaining quality, safety, efficiency, and training; monitoring employees; realigning assignments; and reporting completion dates to defendant’s Production Control & Logistics department.
Plaintiff alleged that Moberg supervised her more vigorously than others by excessive questioning and monitoring. She claimed he inquired about her completion time repeatedly—every ten minutes—day after day, while only asking other employees like David Pearson about their units once in the morning. Plaintiff also alleged Moberg monitored her more closely than his 30-35 other supervisees, making her “feel uncomfortable.”
In May 2022, defendant hired a new employee named Connor Tong to work the sixth shift, and plaintiff helped train him. On three occasions (May 3, May 24, and May 26, 2022), Moberg transferred units that plaintiff was working on to Tong. Plaintiff feared this would give Tong credit for finishing the parts rather than her, which would hurt her hour totals. However, plaintiff never received any reprimand, punishment, or additional work hours as a result of these incidents, and defendant’s policy was to look at combined standard hours earned during training periods.
In 2022, defendant made changes to plaintiff’s work area by providing new platforms to replace wooden boxes that sometimes served as stools. Plaintiff had previously raised concerns to Moberg about the stability of her stool and suggested a mat as a possible solution. Moberg determined a mat was too soft to provide enhanced stability and instead sought assistance from an environmental health safety engineer, resulting in plaintiff receiving multiple platforms.
After measuring plaintiff’s workstation on April 27, 2022, Moberg allegedly said, “Yes, I have seen [plaintiff] almost slip from the box as she was posing. She can pose on the stepstool even better than before,” and then winked at plaintiff. Moberg denied making the comment. When defendant investigated, two out of three witnesses did not recall hearing the comment.
Plaintiff also lodged two complaints against coworkers. In January 2022, she reported that coworker Lori Atwood showed plaintiff her personal information on Atwood’s phone and asked “probing questions” about where plaintiff lived. Defendant investigated and concluded the complaint was “not substantiated,” as Atwood had found unclaimed property belonging to plaintiff on the Kansas State Treasury website (public information) and was trying to be helpful. Plaintiff also reported that a female coworker said “f*** you, bitch” to her while another coworker laughed. Defendant investigated but couldn’t substantiate this allegation due to conflicting reports, though defendant still had a “level set” conversation with all involved parties to set expectations for proper workplace conduct.
Legal Analysis
McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Framework:
The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims. Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case. If satisfied, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Then, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show there is a genuine dispute whether the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual.
Discrimination Claims:
To make a prima facie case for discrimination, plaintiff needed to show: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the challenged action took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Defendant didn’t dispute that plaintiff—a Hispanic woman of Mexican national origin—belonged to a protected class, but argued she failed to establish the second and third requirements.
The court analyzed whether plaintiff’s allegations constituted adverse employment actions. After Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, an adverse employment action requires “some disadvantageous change in an employment term or condition” or “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” The court determined that Moberg’s monitoring and questioning didn’t qualify as an adverse employment action because no discipline or reprimand followed his observations, and plaintiff didn’t identify any other harm to her employment terms or conditions. Similarly, the reassignment of units during training and any decreased productivity didn’t constitute an adverse employment action, as no reprimand followed and plaintiff remained employed. Finally, Moberg’s alleged delay in providing a workstation safety solution didn’t qualify as an adverse employment action because mere delay, without more, is insufficient.
Even if plaintiff had established adverse employment actions, the court found she failed to raise an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff relied solely on her own statements about Moberg’s treatment of her compared to others, which was insufficient to create an issue of material fact. Her deposition testimony undermined her reliance on “visible and audible observations” of differential treatment, as she admitted she faced the wall most of the workday and couldn’t hear conversations Moberg had with most other operators.
Retaliation Claims:
For a prima facie retaliation claim, plaintiff needed to show: (1) she engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.
The parties stipulated that plaintiff previously submitted multiple discrimination complaints to KHRC, satisfying the first requirement. However, the court found plaintiff failed to establish that any of the alleged actions constituted materially adverse actions that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Additionally, plaintiff never adduced evidence that Moberg knew about her KHRC complaints, which was a prerequisite to establishing the causal connection for a retaliation claim.
Harassment/Hostile Work Environment Claims:
For harassment claims, the court explained that different standards apply depending on whether the alleged harasser is a supervisor or coworker. When the harasser is a coworker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions. In cases of supervisor harassment, an employer may be vicariously liable depending on the circumstances.
The court found no reasonable jury could conclude defendant was negligent in its response to plaintiff’s coworker harassment complaints. Defendant investigated both incidents promptly and, despite finding them unsubstantiated, even conducted a “level set” conversation after the “bitch” incident to reinforce workplace professionalism standards.
For both supervisor and coworker harassment claims, plaintiff needed to show the alleged harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment.” The court concluded that none of plaintiff’s grievances were physically threatening or objectively humiliating enough to meet the severity threshold. The isolated “posing” comment and other supervisor actions landed on the “merely offensive” end of the severity spectrum. Similarly, the court found plaintiff’s grievances, consisting primarily of one-off isolated incidents, didn’t add up to the kind of repeated, constant, frequent behavior required to establish pervasiveness.
The court granted summary judgment in defendant’s favor against all of plaintiff’s discrimination, retaliation, and harassment claims because she failed to adduce evidence sufficient to establish prima facie cases of discrimination and retaliation, and her harassment allegations didn’t rise to the level of severity or pervasiveness required for a hostile work environment claim.
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