Plaintiff Reubin E. LaCaze, Jr. sued defendant Wade Gourley and others in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, raising claims of racial discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims except LaCaze’s § 1981 racial discrimination claim against Gourley, and Gourley is appealing the denial of qualified immunity to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Factual Overview
Reubin LaCaze is an African-American officer who has served in the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) since 1993. In 2019, Wade Gourley, OCPD’s Chief of Police, terminated LaCaze’s employment for allegedly falsifying a police report and misleading supervisors regarding the loss of a small quantity of an unknown substance believed to be methamphetamine. LaCaze successfully arbitrated his termination and was reinstated. He subsequently sued Gourley, three other officers, and Oklahoma City, alleging they had discriminated against him based on race in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The district court granted summary judgment on all claims except LaCaze’s § 1981 racial discrimination claim against Gourley. On that claim, the court denied Gourley’s request for qualified immunity. The court concluded there was a disputed issue of material fact at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis—whether two proposed comparators (Officer Brewer and Detective Carter) were similarly situated to LaCaze but received lesser punishment because they were white—and therefore a disputed fact question existed as to whether Gourley’s termination of LaCaze violated a constitutional right. The court also concluded that it is clearly established that employment discrimination based on race is forbidden by § 1981.
Legal Analysis
Interlocutory Appellate Jurisdiction
The court first addressed its jurisdiction to hear Gourley’s interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. The court noted that under the collateral order doctrine, it has jurisdiction to review “abstract issues of law” in qualified immunity appeals. However, the court lacks jurisdiction to review factual conclusions, such as whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for a jury to decide. The court explained that it may review the record de novo only when the version of events the district court holds a reasonable jury could credit is “blatantly contradicted by the record” or when “the district court commits legal error en route to a factual determination.”
Comparator Evidence – Officer Brewer
Gourley argued that Officer Brewer was not a similarly situated comparator because Gourley never supervised LaCaze or Brewer, and he was not Chief when the investigations into either officer began. The court rejected this argument, explaining that a shared supervisor is not a comparator requirement; it is sufficient if the plaintiff and the comparator shared the same decision-maker. It was undisputed that after becoming Chief, Gourley made the final decisions to discipline Brewer and terminate LaCaze.
Gourley also attempted to draw factual distinctions between LaCaze’s alleged misconduct and Brewer’s, asserting he believed LaCaze’s was more serious. The court explained that this argument rested on Gourley’s view of the facts, not on accepting the district court’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Brewer and LaCaze were similarly situated. The court noted that whether two employees are similarly situated ordinarily presents a question of fact for the jury.
Comparator Evidence – Detective Carter
Regarding Detective Carter, Gourley contended that Carter and LaCaze were not similarly situated because (1) Internal Affairs concluded the charge against Carter was unsubstantiated, and (2) Carter was still under investigation by the Oklahoma Attorney General. The court determined these arguments contested the district court’s factual conclusion that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Carter was similarly situated to LaCaze, and consequently the court lacked jurisdiction to review them.
Pretext Analysis
Gourley argued that if the district court had properly applied principles from Kendrick v. Penske Transportation Services, Inc., there would be no triable question of fact arising from a ‘pretext’ determination. The court found this again disputed the district court’s conclusion that the evidence raised a genuine factual dispute that a jury must decide. The court explained that application of the Kendrick principles does not mean a court must assume the credibility or good faith of the decision-maker’s asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment decision.
Clearly Established Law
Finally, Gourley summarily claimed there was no “relevant law [that] was clearly established at the time of the subject event.” However, he failed to develop any challenge to the district court’s conclusion that it is clearly established that employment discrimination on the basis of race is forbidden by § 1981. The court found he had waived appellate review of that conclusion and, in any event, agreed with the district court that the case law was sufficiently clear for Gourley to have understood that discriminating against LaCaze on the basis of race was unlawful.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Gourley’s motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity.
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