Plaintiff Stan Laber sued defendant Pete Hegseth, Secretary of the United States Department of Defense, in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas raising claims of employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The district court granted summary judgment in defendant’s favor on most claims, but one retaliation claim proceeded to trial where a jury found in favor of Laber but awarded only nominal damages, and Laber appealed the district court’s denial of his post-judgment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Factual Overview
Between 1981 and January 2015, Stan Laber worked for various federal agencies including the Department of the Army and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), gaining a reputation as an Equal Employment Opportunity “frequent filer” due to numerous EEO complaints and lawsuits during his federal employment. Most recently, he worked as a contract specialist for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in Virginia before voluntarily retiring on January 9, 2015, and beginning to receive an annuity under the Civil Service Retirement System.
Between June 2014 and April 2015, Laber applied for thirty-two positions with DCMA, all located outside Virginia, but was not offered any position. In late 2018, he filed a pro se complaint against the Secretary of Defense alleging intentional discrimination based on age, sex, religion, and retaliation for prior complaints in violation of Title VII and the ADEA. His second amended complaint assigned each of the thirty-two job applications a “Charge” number from 1 to 32.
The case involved complex procedural history with cross-motions for partial summary judgment. For Charge 2, which involved Laber’s unsuccessful application for a contract administrator position in Milwaukee in September 2014, the district court found genuine disputes regarding retaliation but ruled that Laber could not recover backpay or other economic damages because he voluntarily retired and failed to mitigate damages. For Charge 12, involving an unsuccessful application for a contract administrator position in San Diego in December 2014, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
The case proceeded to trial solely on Charge 2 in February 2023. After voluntary dismissals and court dismissals, only religious discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII remained for jury consideration. The jury found against Laber on religious discrimination but found in his favor on retaliation, concluding the defendant declined to hire him because he previously opposed unlawful employment practices. However, the jury refused to award compensatory damages.
After trial, Laber moved to amend his complaint to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, specifically requesting retroactive reinstatement to the denied job. The district court denied this motion as untimely and entered judgment awarding Laber one dollar in nominal damages and costs. Laber then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing the district court erred in refusing to award more than nominal damages on his retaliation claim and in granting summary judgment on Charge 12. The district court denied this motion, prompting Laber’s appeal.
Legal Analysis
Charge 2 Damages and Remedies
Laber challenged the district court’s pretrial ruling that he could not receive backpay and its post-trial refusal to reinstate him to a contract administrator position. The court applied the principle that Title VII claimants have a statutory duty to minimize damages, requiring reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment. A claimant who resigns from a job for personal reasons has not adequately mitigated damages.
The court found that Laber had actual notice of the discrimination underlying Charge 2 as of December 9 and December 30, 2014, before his voluntary retirement on January 9, 2015. Despite Laber’s argument that he was not formally notified until March 1, 2015, the undisputed factual record showed he was aware of the claims before retiring. The court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the backpay issue.
Regarding instatement, the court found the district court acted within its discretion in rejecting the request. The district court had concluded the instatement request was untimely and unpreserved, and that instatement was inappropriate because Laber chose to voluntarily retire and become a retired annuitant. The court noted that defendant’s policy significantly restrained hiring retired annuitants, and the defendant had not approved hiring a retired annuitant from at least 2014 to May 2022.
Charge 12 Age Discrimination Claim
Laber challenged the grant of summary judgment on his age discrimination claim under the ADEA. The court reviewed the requirements for establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination, noting that for federal-sector claims under 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), the Supreme Court’s decision in Babb v. Wilkie established that personnel actions must be untainted by any consideration of age, though but-for causation remains important for determining appropriate remedies.
The district court had found a material dispute regarding whether Laber’s age played a part in the decision not to interview him, but concluded he failed to establish he was qualified for the position. The court found it undisputed that DCMA had not received approval for hiring a retired annuitant, the position was permanent rather than temporary as required by policy, and none of the limited circumstances allowing hiring of retired annuitants were met.
The appellate court found Laber’s challenge inadequate because he incorporated arguments from his Rule 59(e) motion by reference rather than presenting proper appellate arguments. Even considering the incorporated arguments, they were perfunctory and lacked record citations or legal authority. Laber’s assertion about Babb’s “lower causation bar” was similarly deficient, lacking case or record citations required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8).
Sanctions Request
Laber sought sanctions against both the district court and the defendant, alleging judicial misconduct, bias, frivolous arguments, and deceptive conduct. The court readily rejected this request, noting Laber failed to cite any authority to support his sanctions claim.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment on Laber’s Title VII retaliation claim with nominal damages while rejecting his challenges to the damages limitation and denial of summary judgment on his age discrimination claim.
Schrag on Law 