Plaintiff Petra Brokken sued defendant Hennepin County in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota raising claims of religious discrimination under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, and wrongful discharge under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute. The district court dismissed all claims for failure to state a claim, and Brokken appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Factual Overview
Hennepin County required all employees to receive the COVID-19 vaccine or test weekly during the pandemic. Brokken requested a religious exemption from both vaccination and testing requirements. After initially granting an accommodation, the County revised its policy and informed Brokken that she would be terminated if she refused to test, and that such termination would result in the likely loss of benefits including banked vacation time, sick time, and comp time. Brokken had accrued over 1,285 hours of benefits and believed a coworker had been terminated without benefits under similar circumstances. Faced with this ultimatum, Brokken “retired under duress.”
In her complaint, Brokken alleged she held deeply sincere spiritual beliefs including the sanctity of privacy, personal autonomy, and bodily integrity that “order her life like a religion orders the lives of people who believe in God and traditional religions.” She claimed she must treat her body as a “Temple” and that each person has the right to choose what to put into their body based on free will. She stated her beliefs required her to control what enters her body and to avoid toxins, explaining that she does not take pharmaceutical products. Regarding testing, Brokken alleged her religious beliefs prohibited providing DNA or biological materials by force or coercion, as the use and possession of her biological materials had been granted to her by her Creator. She also objected to the testing process because it involved mixing her biological materials with fetal bovine serum, which she believed was obtained through torture of calves in violation of her sincerely held beliefs.
Legal Analysis
Adverse Employment Action
The court addressed whether Brokken adequately pleaded an adverse employment action, which is required for all her claims. The district court had dismissed the claims finding no adverse employment action, but the Eighth Circuit reversed. The court applied the recent Supreme Court decision in Muldrow v. St. Louis, which lowered the standard for adverse employment actions, requiring only “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment” without requiring the harm to be “significant,” “serious,” or “substantial.” The court found that Brokken’s retirement under duress constituted an adverse employment action because the County threatened her with termination and loss of over 1,285 hours of banked benefits, which represented a “disadvantageous change” in compensation.
The court also analyzed whether Brokken met the standard for constructive discharge, finding she satisfied both required elements: that a reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign due to discrimination, and that she actually resigned. The court concluded that facing a choice between violating sincerely held religious beliefs and termination with loss of significant benefits would compel a reasonable person to resign.
Title VII Religious Discrimination Claims
The court reversed the dismissal of Brokken’s Title VII claims, finding she adequately pleaded both the existence of sincerely held religious beliefs and that those beliefs conflicted with the employer’s policy. The court applied the standard from Ringhofer, requiring plaintiffs to “adequately identify religious views they believe to conflict with” the employer’s policy, noting that beliefs need not be “acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others.” The court found Brokken’s complaint sufficiently connected her religious objections to specific principles: her belief in treating her body as a Temple connected to her vaccine objection, and her belief that biological materials were granted by her Creator connected to her testing objection.
The court rejected the County’s argument that the policy applied equally to all employees, explaining that courts generally do not inquire about comparators until summary judgment and that reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor at the pleading stage. The court clarified that failure to accommodate claims are analyzed as disparate treatment claims under Title VII, not as freestanding causes of action.
Minnesota Human Rights Act Claims
The court reversed the dismissal of Brokken’s MHRA claims, applying the same analysis used for Title VII claims. The district court had dismissed these claims concluding the MHRA did not provide a cause of action for failure to accommodate religious beliefs. However, the Eighth Circuit relied on its recent decision in Ringhofer, which held that the Minnesota Supreme Court would decide that the MHRA provides protection against failures to accommodate religious beliefs. Since Brokken plausibly pleaded religious discrimination under Title VII, she also plausibly pleaded religious discrimination under the MHRA.
Minnesota Refusal of Treatment Statute
The court affirmed dismissal of Brokken’s claim under Minnesota Statute Section 12.39, finding the statute does not create a private right of action. The court noted that while the statute provides that individuals have a fundamental right to refuse medical treatment, testing, and vaccination, it does not expressly or by clear implication identify a statutory right of action. The court relied on Minnesota precedent requiring explicit language or clear implication for statutory causes of action. Additionally, the statute provides its own remedy through criminal penalties, including fines up to $1,000 and imprisonment up to 90 days, indicating the legislature chose to impose criminal rather than civil penalties.
The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding Brokken’s Title VII and MHRA religious discrimination claims while affirming dismissal of her claim under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute.
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