Plaintiffs Raymond Hildebrand and Taylor Hildebrand sued Defendants Secretary Frank Kendall and the United States Defense Department in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma raising claims of religious discrimination, disparate treatment, and retaliation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the D.C. Human Rights Act. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court granted the motion to dismiss without any magistrate judge involvement in this case.
Factual Overview
Plaintiffs are civilian federal-sector employees at Tinker Air Force Base who sought religious exemptions from the COVID-19 vaccine mandate based on their sincere, deeply held religious beliefs. While their exemption requests were pending, they were required to submit to weekly COVID-19 tests as a reasonable accommodation. The vaccine mandate was subsequently enjoined by a federal district court before their religious exemption requests were adjudicated, and President Biden later rescinded the executive order entirely.
Despite the enjoining of the vaccine mandate, Plaintiffs were still required to submit to weekly COVID-19 tests or face termination. Notably, vaccinated federal employees and unvaccinated employees who had received medical exemptions were not required to continue weekly testing. The only group of federal employees required to submit to weekly COVID-19 tests after the vaccine mandate was enjoined were those who had been excepted from the mandate on religious grounds. The case was originally filed in the District of Columbia but was transferred to the Western District of Oklahoma.
Legal Analysis
Standard for Federal Employee Claims vs. Private Employee Claims
The court addressed a threshold issue regarding the appropriate legal standard for federal employee discrimination claims. Plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, which lowered the standard for adverse employment actions in private sector cases, should apply equally to federal employee claims. The court disagreed, finding that different statutory provisions govern private and federal employment discrimination claims. While private sector claims are governed by § 2000e-2(a)(1), federal employee claims fall under § 2000e-16(a), which requires proof of adverse “personnel actions” rather than merely “some harm” to employment terms or conditions.
Definition of Personnel Actions
Following the Supreme Court’s approach in Babb v. Wilkie and the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Nelson v. DeJoy, the court imported the definition of “personnel actions” from the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Under this definition, personnel actions include appointments, promotions, disciplinary actions, transfers, performance evaluations, decisions concerning pay and benefits, and “any other significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions.” The court focused on whether the weekly COVID-19 testing requirement constituted a significant change in working conditions.
Religious Discrimination and Disparate Treatment Claims
The court found that being subjected to weekly COVID-19 tests did not constitute a significant change in working conditions sufficient to qualify as a personnel action. The court noted that Plaintiffs did not take issue with the weekly testing requirement when the vaccine mandate was initially in place and claimed they were able to perform their job functions with the accommodation. The court emphasized that while the differential treatment based on religious exemption status might be problematic, the weekly testing itself did not meaningfully affect their jobs in terms of transfers, terminations, pay reductions, discipline, demotions, or other tangible employment consequences.
Retaliation Claims
The court dismissed the retaliation claim for lack of factual enhancement in the pleadings. While Plaintiffs claimed they were retaliated against for requesting religious accommodations, they failed to adequately allege a materially adverse action taken in response to their protected activity. The court found that Plaintiffs’ own allegations undermined their retaliation claim by stating that the testing requirement was based on their religion and protected class status rather than being causally connected to their request for accommodation.
D.C. Human Rights Act Claims
The court dismissed the D.C. Human Rights Act claims, finding that Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment, thereby precluding any additional state or local discrimination claims.
The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss on all claims, finding that Plaintiffs failed to state plausible claims for religious discrimination, disparate treatment, and retaliation under Title VII, and that their D.C. Human Rights Act claims were precluded by Title VII’s exclusivity in federal employment discrimination cases.
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