Karyn Stanley sued the City of Sanford, Florida in federal court raising claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act regarding discriminatory retirement health insurance benefits. The district court dismissed Stanley’s ADA claim, finding she was not a “qualified individual” at the time of discrimination, and Stanley appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal.
Factual Overview
Karyn Stanley worked as a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida from 1999 until her disability retirement in 2018. When Stanley was hired, the City offered health insurance until age 65 for two categories of retirees: those with 25 years of service and those who retired earlier due to disability. In 2003, the City changed its policy to provide health insurance up to age 65 only for retirees with 25 years of service, while those who retired earlier due to disability would receive just 24 months of coverage. Stanley later developed a disability that forced her to retire in 2018 after 19 years of service, entitling her to only 24 months of health insurance under the revised policy.
Stanley filed suit claiming the City violated the ADA by providing different health insurance benefits based on disability status. The district court dismissed her ADA claim, reasoning that the alleged discrimination occurred after she retired when she was no longer a “qualified individual” under Title I of the ADA because she no longer held or sought a job with the defendant. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this ruling, joining the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in holding that Title I does not protect people who neither held nor desired a job at the time of discrimination, while the Second and Third Circuits had taken the opposite view.
Legal Analysis
Whether Title I of the ADA Protects Retired Employees:
The Supreme Court examined whether a retired employee who does not hold or seek a job is a “qualified individual” under Title I of the ADA. The Court analyzed the statutory text of Section 12112(a), which makes it unlawful to discriminate against a “qualified individual” on the basis of disability regarding compensation. A “qualified individual” is defined as someone “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that [she] holds or desires.”
The Court found that Congress’s use of present-tense verbs (“holds,” “desires,” “can perform”) signals that Section 12112(a) protects individuals able to do the job they hold or seek at the time they suffer discrimination, not retirees who neither hold nor desire a job. The Court reinforced this interpretation by examining the statute’s definition of “reasonable accommodation,” which includes job restructuring and modifying facilities used by employees—accommodations that make sense for current employees but not retirees.
The Court also compared Title I to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, noting that while Title VII protects “employees” without temporal qualification and sometimes covers former employees, where Title VII links “employee” to present-tense verbs, it refers to current employees. Similarly, the ADA’s “qualified individual” coupled with present-tense verbs suggests current job holders or seekers.
Stanley’s Alternative Arguments:
Stanley argued that the “qualified individual” requirement should be read as a conditional mandate—applicable only if a plaintiff holds or seeks a job, making every retiree automatically “qualified” if they neither hold nor seek employment. The Court rejected this interpretation as conceivable but convoluted, preferring the ordinary reading of the statute.
Stanley also made a surplusage argument, contending that the Court’s reading would render meaningless Section 12112(b)(5)(A)’s reference to “applicant or employee.” The Court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that the phrase might still serve a narrowing function and that the canon against surplusage is not absolute.
Finally, Stanley invoked the ADA’s purpose of eradicating disability-based discrimination, arguing this goal would be best served by extending Title I’s protections to retirees. The Court responded that legislation does not pursue its purposes at all costs and that other laws may protect retirees from discrimination.
Application to Stanley’s Specific Case:
In Part III, Justice Gorsuch addressed whether Stanley’s specific complaint could survive under the Court’s interpretation. The Court identified three potential times when discrimination could occur under the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act: when a discriminatory practice is adopted, when an individual is affected by it, or when someone becomes subject to it.
The Court found that Stanley could not proceed under the first option because her complaint provided no basis for inferring the City’s 2003 policy injured her at that time, as she was not disabled and expected to complete 25 years of service. The second option also failed because when Stanley was affected by the policy in 2020, she had been retired for two years and was not seeking employment.
The third option, becoming subject to discriminatory compensation, might have been promising since Stanley was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2016 and worked until 2018, potentially making her subject to the discriminatory policy while still a qualified individual. However, the Court noted several case-specific problems: Stanley’s complaint did not allege the timing or nature of her diagnosis, the Eleventh Circuit found she had disavowed this theory in her brief below, and Stanley had not asked the Supreme Court to review the Eleventh Circuit’s preservation ruling.
Justice Thomas’s Concurrence
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Barrett, concurred in Parts I and II but wrote separately to express concern about the increasingly common practice of litigants asking the Court to grant certiorari on one question and then pivoting to an entirely different question at the merits stage. Thomas noted that Stanley had urged the Court to grant review to resolve a circuit split about whether the ADA permits suits by former employees who can no longer perform essential job functions, but then argued for the first time at the merits stage that she could sue based on discrimination that occurred while still employed. Thomas argued this practice is disruptive to the Court’s deliberative process and undermines efforts to manage the merits docket efficiently.
Justice Sotomayor’s Partial Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Sotomayor joined Parts III and IV of Justice Jackson’s dissent because she believed Title I’s prohibition on disability discrimination does not cease when an employee retires. She agreed with Justice Jackson that when an employer makes a discriminatory change in postemployment benefits that a retiree earned while qualified and employed, the employer discriminates against the person in their capacity as a qualified individual. However, she agreed with the plurality that Stanley’s theory could not form a basis for reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment because Stanley had not asked the Court to review the circuit court’s forfeiture ruling.
Justice Jackson’s Dissent
Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor on Parts III and IV except footnote 12, dissented from the majority’s interpretation of Title I. Jackson argued that the Court was deciding a question not presented by the actual facts of the case, since Stanley was subjected to the allegedly discriminatory policy while still employed and disabled, making her a qualified individual at the relevant time.
Procedural Arguments: Jackson contended that the Court should have applied its traditional rule allowing parties to make any argument in support of a properly presented claim, and that Stanley’s complaint contained sufficient allegations to support her theory that discrimination occurred while employed. Jackson criticized the plurality for not accepting Stanley’s factual allegations as required in a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and for penalizing Stanley for preservation issues created by the Eleventh Circuit.
Substantive Interpretation of Title I: Jackson argued that the majority misread Title I by using the qualified individual definition as a strict temporal limit when it was designed only to protect employers from having to employ those who cannot do the work. Jackson contended that the qualified individual provision should be read as a conditional mandate that applies only when someone seeks to obtain or keep a job, not as a blanket temporal restriction.
Jackson argued that retirement benefits are deferred compensation for past service that workers earn while employed, so postemployment discrimination in benefit payouts retroactively discriminates against previously qualified individuals. She criticized the majority for creating arbitrary results where protection depends on the timing of discrimination rather than when benefits were earned.
Broader ADA Purposes: Jackson emphasized that Title I was designed to provide comprehensive protection against disability discrimination, including in retirement benefits, and that the majority’s interpretation undermines these protections precisely when they matter most. She argued for interpreting the statute consistent with its text, context, and congressional purposes rather than through “pure textualism.”
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment, holding that to prevail under Section 12112(a) of the ADA, a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job and could perform its essential functions at the time of an employer’s alleged act of disability-based discrimination.
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